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DISCUSSION PAPER 
PROVIDENTIALISM, THE PLEDGE AND VICTORIAN HANGOVERS: 
INVESTIGATING MODERATE ALCOHOL POLICY 
IN BRITAIN, 1914-1918 
Henry Yeomans1 
 
Introduction 
This discussion piece is based on research undertaken as part of the author‟s ongoing PhD 
project. Drawing on history, sociology, criminology and law, the broader empirical enquiry 
investigates attitudes to alcohol and their relationship with the development of laws relating 
to alcohol (primarily in England and Wales) from the nineteenth century onwards. It builds on 
the insights of moral regulation theory, as espoused by Philip Corrigan and Derek Sayer2 as 
well as Alan Hunt3, in order to position the law within a wider project through which individual 
behaviour is governed. Consequently, a diverse range of sources, including newspaper 
reportage, cartoons, health promotion literature and advertising, are drawn upon to help 
understand the various ways, legally and morally, through which people were, and are, 
compelled to behave in particular ways. This piece focuses on the period 1914-1918 and, in 
accordance with these theoretical formulations, raises issues relating to both legal and extra-
legal efforts to govern alcohol consumption in Britain during World War One. In particular, it 
draws attention to the widespread promotion of the teetotal pledge during this period as a 
means to help Britain‟s war effort. 
 
The issue of drink during World War One is a neglected area of research. James Nicholls 
gives a useful description of the governmental response to alcohol during the war, but public 
attitudes are not his primary focus.4 John Greenaway examines the period in a little more 
depth, concentrating largely on the rise to dominance of the secular issue of national 
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efficiency which encompasses industrial productivity and military discipline.5 But is 
Greenaway‟s work, emphasising the „rational‟ explanation of national efficiency, enough to 
explain the borderline hysteria over alcohol consumption at the time, encapsulated by Lloyd 
George‟s famous claim that „we are fighting three foes, Germany, Austria and Drink: and as 
far as I can see the greatest of these deadly foes is Drink‟?6 Or can the investigation of 
contemporaneous public discourse and an appreciation Victorian temperance ideology 
improve our understanding? This discussion incorporates a longer-term historical focus and 
an enquiry into public attitudes into the investigation of British alcohol policy, 1914-1918.  
 
1 The Enigma of British Alcohol Policy, 1914-1918 
From 1914-1918, alcohol policies internationally were fundamentally re-evaluated. The 
pressures of war led to an increased drive for sobriety which produced tough restrictions on 
the drinks trade with many countries, such as Belgium and Canada, adopting prohibition as 
a wartime measure. After World War One, prohibition remained a viable legal option; 
Finland, Norway and Russia were among the countries who upheld its implementation for 
several years after the war and, in 1919, the USA amended its constitution in order to make 
the trade in alcohol illegal. Prohibition was not the only wartime drink measure; France 
banned absinthe while Sweden strengthened its existing system of municipal ownership and 
introduced an alcohol rationing regime.7 Britain, however, refrained from implementing 
radical policies of alcohol control; prohibition and the full-scale nationalisation of the drinks 
industry were much debated, but never enacted. This paper highlights how, despite the 
international context and the pressures of war, the British government resisted pressure to 
implement radical measures to regulate alcohol. 
 
This peculiar comparative situation becomes more curious if we consider Britain‟s strong 
history of temperance campaigning which had been sustained since the 1830s. The British 
temperance movement was one of the largest and most pervasive social movements of the 
Victorian period. The early movement was dominated by moral suasionists, who believed 
that the individual pledge of abstinence and the routine of self-denial it entailed was the best 
means to overcome the problem of alcohol. But by the 1860s, this approach was in decline 
and prohibitionists, such as the UK Alliance, had taken over the campaigning momentum. 
For prohibitionists, the law was a crucial means through which the population could be 
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reformed (and improved) and supporters favoured some form of prohibition, usually the „local 
option‟, to achieve this. This policy was based around the idea that local communities would 
vote on whether or not they wanted the alcohol trade to continue in their area. If they voted 
„no‟ (usually with a two-thirds majority), as the Alliance fully expected, the drinks trade would 
be outlawed locally. Although moral suasionists were not overly-concerned with legal 
measures, for prohibitionists legal developments, such as the Licensing Act 1872, did not go 
anywhere near far enough in curbing the drinks trade. Restrictions may have engendered 
some incremental improvements, but the law still amounted to a „legalized system of 
temptation‟8 that was incapable of truly solving the drink problem. Given these campaigns for 
strict drink controls in the near past, alcohol policies during the war appear odder still.  
 
The links of the temperance movement to the Liberal Party also complicate the issue. The 
Liberal Party grew closer to temperance groups in the 1870s, although some blamed these 
associations for electoral losses. The Liberal Licensing Bill 1871 proposed a cap on the 
number of licensed premises per number of inhabitants of any given area but was rejected 
by Parliament. The Liberals did succeed in getting the Licensing Act 1872 through 
Parliament but this was a more tempered piece of legislation, and the controversial licence 
cap had been dropped. The Liberals lost the 1874 general election heavily and Gladstone, 
declaring that „we have been borne down in a torrent of gin and beer‟,9 blamed the defeat on 
a reaction against Liberal attempts to restrict the drinks trade. Given Gladstone‟s views, it 
would have been understandable if the Liberal Party had shied away from formulating strict 
alcohol measures in the aftermath of 1874. But, nevertheless, they continued to maintain 
links with the temperance movement and, after once again forming a government in the 
1890s, presented to Parliament two separate, but unsuccessful Bills which enshrined 
variants of the (prohibitionist) local option. Not dissuaded, the Liberals included a limit on the 
number of licensed premises per head of population in the Licensing Bill 1908, although 
again this provision failed to get Parliamentary approval.10 The Liberals did not, therefore, 
distance themselves from temperance measures post-1874 and actually seem to have 
retained an active interest in strict drink laws up until the outbreak of war. 
 
Pre-war temperance sympathies are not the only reason why the Liberal Government‟s 
response appears odd. Although, temperance mobilisation decreased noticeably after the 
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turn of twentieth century11 it was resurgent during wartime. This was particularly evident in 
the formation of the Strength of Britain Movement in 1916, a prohibitionist group, who argued 
that sobriety and hard work were needed to maximise efficiency (both military and industrial) 
during the war effort.12 The advent of new prohibitionist groups shows there was some 
momentum behind calls for strict, radical measures and general opinion was certainly more 
supportive of strong legislative action during World War One than at previous times. At a 
meeting of the „free churches‟, Mr Parr claimed that „During the war, patriotism demands 
prohibition‟,13 and, towards the end of the war, the National Liberal Federation came out in 
favour of full local control of the liquor traffic.14 Nicholls reports that Lloyd George supported 
nationalisation,15 and the Manchester Guardian argued that „State ownership would for the 
first time make it possible to legislate other than by mere prohibition on the vice of 
drinking‟.16 The paper went on to claim that, although it is more visible in wartime, private 
vice always impacts upon the state and so the state can legitimately intervene. The 
interventionist attitude of new campaign groups and sections of public opinion again render 
the British wartime alcohol policies curious. 
 
So, the British Government‟s refrain from implementing radical alcohol policies during World 
War One is not just a curious riddle when compared to the actions of other country‟s 
governments during the same period. This central riddle is wrapped in the mystery of 
Britain‟s temperance history and concealed within the enigma of Liberal Party connections 
and public opinion at the time. So if strict measures such as prohibition and nationalisation 
were avoided, what exactly did the British Government do? 
 
2 What was the British Response? 
To many, war intensified the need for tighter restrictions on alcohol as national survival was 
seen to hinge on both the combat readiness of large swathes of the young male population, 
and the productive capabilities of workers in certain strategically important industries. Lloyd 
George added a sense of urgency to this situation by claiming, in 1915, that „drink is doing 
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us more damage in the war than all the German submarines put together‟.17 So how did the 
governance of alcohol change in response to the outbreak of war?  
 
Some aspects of the governmental response were entirely predictable. One such 
unremarkable measure was the increase in levels of taxation levied on the trade in alcoholic 
drinks. By the twentieth century, it was well-established in Britain that taxation could be used 
to either discourage consumption or raise government revenue; the Gin Act 1729 raised the 
excise duty on gin in an effort to discourage consumption and Lloyd George‟s 1910 budget 
also contained considerable tax rises for both brewer and pub licences.18 Slightly more novel 
was the decision, enforced by the Central Control Board (CCB) which oversaw most British 
alcohol policy during World War One, to limit the strength of alcoholic spirits available for 
public purchase.19 Such a measure, not dissimilar to France‟s banning of absinthe, had 
never been enacted before. However, the Gin Act 1736 did inflate the cost of a licence to 
such an extent that it amounted to a prohibition of gin.20 Moreover various licensing 
initiatives, from the Beer Act 1830 to Gladstone‟s liberalisation of the wine trade in the 
1860s, were at least partially motivated by an attempt to wean people off spirits by promoting 
the trade in weaker alcoholic drinks. Increased taxation and restrictions on the strength of 
spirits do not, therefore, amount to any radical new departure in alcohol policy. 
 
The same point can be made in respect of one of the key planks of the wartime alcohol 
policy, restricted hours of sale. During the war, the CCB restricted public houses to opening 
from Midday to 2:30pm and 6:30pm to 9:30pm.21 The implementation of morning and 
afternoon closure was a new idea (and one that was retained in the Licensing Act 1921), but 
the idea of restricted hours of sale was not new to the drinks industry. In the Victorian era, 
Beer Houses had operated within set hours from their creation by the Beer Act 1830. Public 
Houses (which could sell wines and spirits as well as beer, ale or cider) were restricted for 
the first time in the mid-1860s and, building on these reforms, the Licensing Act 1872 
introduced fixed closing times for public houses, which were either 10pm, 11pm or midnight 
depending on the size of the town. Although it is now commonplace to hear that closing 
times were first introduced in Britain during World War One, they were actually significantly 
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older. Wartime opening hours were stringently reduced but, as with taxation, this was the 
tightening of an existing regulation rather than the creation of a new one.  
 
Some of the Government‟s measures had less historic precedents. On the outbreak of war, 
the „treating‟ of soldiers and sailors to drink22 immediately became a public issue and, in 
September 1914, H.H. Croydon, of the Church of England Temperance Society, wrote to 
The Times imploring people to refrain from this popular custom.23 This call was echoed by 
both the Minister of War Lord Kitchener and his sister, Mrs Frances Parker, who asked 
people not to „treat‟ servicemen in the interests of their „efficiency and wellbeing‟.24 While 
initially the justification for concerns about treating referred to the need to reduce the 
consumption of alcohol by servicemen in order to maximise military effectiveness, the terms 
of the debate quickly came to encompass the drinking habits of the civilian population also. 
In late 1914, a letter in The Times from E.F. Chapman asked „Do we, as a nation, realize 
that temperance is necessary to efficiency in war? Can we understand that it must be 
adopted by our civilian population as well as by our sailors and soldiers as a national 
habit?‟25 There was a certain logic at work here, as the continued productivity and wealth of 
a nation becomes particularly important during wartime. Thus, under the auspices of the 
CCB, treating was banned in 1915. The ban on treating attracted much comment at the time 
and it was, historically speaking, an unusual measure.26 But if it is compared to some of the 
measures, such as prohibition or nationalisation, contemplated at the time, it hardly appears 
radical. 
 
The concentration on maximising the productive capabilities of the civilian population was 
also behind one truly radical policy pursued by the wartime administration. In certain areas 
the CCB did enact a kind of localised nationalisation of the drinks industry. In 1916, the state 
began purchasing pubs in Enfield Lock, Cromarty Firth and, on a huge scale, Carlisle and its 
environs. These areas were selected due to the fact that they were home to large munitions 
factories and so the sobriety of the local population, many of whom worked in these 
factories, was seen to have a strategic importance for the war-effort. Inspired by the 
„Gothenberg Model‟ of municipal ownership, the CCB replaced the profit motive with a 
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system of „disinterested management‟. Freed from the need to pursue financial gain, pub 
managers (usually on a fixed salary paid by the CCB) began making a number of 
improvements to the pubs they ran: they encouraged the sale of food and soft drinks, as well 
as improving the physical condition and decor of many premises.27 The pubs were often 
operated as works canteens, in the hope that the provision of food would mean workers 
would not opt for a „liquid lunch‟. But this was also an attempt to change the culture of the 
pub, to make it more comfortable, more respectable, and more family-friendly. The 
nationalisation of the drinks industry as an effort to promote sobriety and productivity was, 
therefore, a radical measure; but it was pursued in only a handful of areas. 
 
Prior to World War One, Britain already had reasonably restrictive drink laws. It was 
established practice for British governments to regulate who may sell alcohol, when, and 
(through taxation) at what price; the governmental response to World War One instigated no 
paradigmatic shift away from these legal frameworks. The legal response to alcohol during 
World War One was therefore moderate; it was a mixture of tightening existing restrictions, 
implementing a new but hardly radical ban on „treating‟, and implementing a radical yet small 
scale scheme of nationalisation. But were these moderate legal measures the sum-total of 
ways in which sobriety was promoted in Britain during the war? 
 
3 New Perspectives of the British Governmental Response to WW1  
In line with the theoretical premises of this paper, this section will examine public discourse 
on alcohol during the war in an effort to understand public attitudes to alcohol.  
 
The Pledge Campaign 
An examination of popular discourse during World War One provides some fascinating new 
perspectives on this issue. Press coverage in the early years of World War One reveals that 
voluntary, as well as legal action was demanded. As with treating, these demands were 
initially directed at servicemen; Robert B. Batty wrote „the greatest enemy to military 
efficiency has been insobriety, and its greatest support abstinence‟.28 Batty cited the Russo-
Japanese War as evidence, claiming that the humiliating Russian defeat was due to the 
drunkenness of many of their officers. In another letter to the Manchester Guardian, one 
S.M. Mitra echoes Batty‟s concerns and calls for military clubs, whose clientele were officers, 
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to stop selling alcoholic drinks. The basic idea was that it was unfair to expect the rank-and-
file to abstain from alcohol unless their superiors were prepared to observe the same form of 
teetotal conduct. Mitra explained that „an example set by a military club would go a great 
way towards making Tommy a teetotaller and would be an object lesson to Germany‟.29 
There appears, therefore, to have been a strong belief that teetotal soldiers were markedly 
more effective soldiers. Batty‟s quotation of the late Field Marshall Lord Roberts 
encapsulates this point: „Give me a teetotal army‟, he said, „and I will lead it anywhere‟.30 
While „Tommy the Teetotaller‟ was promoted as a behavioural ideal to be aspired to, his 
German enemies were constructed as beer-drinking savages to be reviled. H.H. Croydon 
(Church of England Temperance Society) contrasted good sober soldiery, as apparently 
typified by the British campaigns in Egypt, with the alleged drunken savagery of German 
soldiers. He explained that „the trail of the German troops is marked, as innumerable 
witnesses testify, by myriads of empty bottles‟, and went on to claim that „in some measure, 
the horrors of the German atrocities have had their origin in intemperance‟.31 This was not an 
isolated point: in 1915, John Rae of the National Temperance League connected beer-
drinking with the „animal and uncivilised habits‟ of German soldiers in Belgium.32 
Furthermore, a cartoon by Sidney Strube in the Daily Express on the 7th May 1915 depicted 
Kaiser Wilhelm II and Admiral Tirpitz celebrating the death of women and children onboard 
the Lusitania by drinking beer.33 Temperance activists had long seen their campaign as 
fighting the evils of drink; it was part, as T.H. Barker put it in 1871, „of the great war between 
Heaven and Hell‟.34 Following Croydon and Rae, it is clear that, for many people, World War 
One represented a physical, literal manifestation of this moral and existential struggle which 
had long been perceived.  The war was not just Britain versus Germany; it was teetotalism 
versus drink, civilisation versus savagery.  
 
As with the ban on treating, behavioural standards initially demanded from servicemen were 
soon required from civilians also.  Soon after the declaration of war, a letter in The Times 
from Gertrude S. Gow called on civilians, as well as soldiers, to take a pledge of 
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abstinence.35 A letter one week later echoed these sentiments, asking „can we understand 
that it (abstinence) must be adopted by our civilian population as well as by our sailors and 
soldiers as a national habit?‟36 But this pledge campaign really began to gather momentum 
when prominent establishment figures began to endorse it. In November 1914, a letter in 
The Times reported that a conference presided over by the Archbishop of Canterbury had 
endorsed a general pledge of abstinence for the duration of the war.37 Many senior clergy 
soon began to echo this call; the Bishop of Durham,38 the Bishop of London39 and the 
Archbishop of York40 were vocal in their support for this measure.  Most notably, King 
George V, and later Lord Kitchener, forbade the consumption of alcohol in all their 
households. These public declarations apparently had an effect on civilian behaviour: both 
the Daily Express and The Times reported that workers were steering clear of pubs.41 In late 
1914, F. Milne claimed that „greater self-control, along with greater self-denial, is expected of 
every citizen in the land‟.42 By April 1915, Milne‟s wish appears to have been, partially at 
least, fulfilled.43  
 
The „official‟ rationale for the pledge campaign, as with treating and teetotalism within the 
military, was about civilians doing their utmost to help the war effort. The Bishop of London 
justified this rationally by highlighting that £160m was spent annually on drink, money which 
could be spent on either paying off the war loan or used to provide relief to Serbia or 
Armenia.44 The precise mechanics of this proposal, however, were unclear. There was the 
issue, firstly, of how it was imagined these savings would contribute towards the war effort: 
would tax, voluntary donations, or something else be used? Secondly, expenditure on drink, 
unlike the Bishop of London‟s vague ideas, did make a direct contribution to the nation‟s 
coffers due to the high level of taxation levied on alcoholic drinks.45 There was also the issue 
of falling revenues for wine exporting countries. A Frenchman wrote to The Times in 1914 
                                            
35
 Gow, Gertrude S., „To the Editor of The Times‟, The Times, 7
 
October 1914. 
36
 Chapman, „Social Welfare in War Time‟. 
37
 Harford, Charles F., „To the Editor of The Times: The Liquor Problem‟, The Times, 31 March 1915. 
38
 Bishop of Durham, „A Great Opportunity. The Clergy and the Pledge‟, The Times, 19 March 1915. 
39
 London, A.F., „To the Editor of The Times: Drink or War Loan?‟ The Times, 24
 
December 1915. 
40
 „Lord Kitchener‟s Pledge‟, Daily Express, 2 April 1915. 
41
 See: „Lord Kitchener‟s Pledge‟ Daily Express; „The King‟s Example‟, The Times, 7 April 1915. 
42
 Milne, F., „To the editor of the Manchester Guardian: Drink and the War‟, Manchester Guardian, 21
 
November 1914. 
43
 Aggregate national alcohol consumption, as recorded by Excise figures, did fall sharply during the 
First World War. Although with so many young men abroad at the time, this trend does not 
necessarily reveal greater sobriety on the part of those who remained behind. 
44
 London, „Drink or War Loan‟. 
45
 A point which the industry groups were quick emphasise; an advert in the Daily Express stressed 
alcohol‟s many plus points, including that it is „a Revenue Producer‟ and therefore, in an ironic twist, 
„part of the Strength of Britain‟. See: „The Strength of Britain‟, Daily Express, 25  January 1917. 
Law, Crime and History (2011) 1 
 
104 
 
pleading with the British not to stop purchasing French wine as this would be „another blow 
to the few remaining trades of France‟.46 Similar points were made at the time about 
Australia, another wine-producing ally – there seemed a genuine risk that collective 
teetotalism would deprive both the British Government and some of Britain‟s allies of much-
needed revenue. Although it may do something to improve industrial productivity or military 
discipline, many of the arguments used to justify the wartime pledge simply do not stand up 
to scrutiny. Why must those not fighting or working in munitions factories abstain from 
alcohol? And why, for that matter, abstinence rather than moderation anyway? 
The Pledge and Providentialism 
Regardless of the dubious economic rationale of the pledge, there was a sense that self-
denial in itself, as enshrined within the pledge, would bring benefits. Mrs Parker claimed that 
if civilians as well as soldiers abstained „then the men who have rallied to the colours would 
be linked to their wives, parents and families at home by a bond which would be for good of 
all‟.47 A newspaper letter (signed by „Curtail‟) in 1915 struck a similar note, arguing that „the 
civilian should feel the sacrifice just as much as the soldier, the rich man just as the poor‟48; 
and the Bishop of London elaborated by describing a widespread desire „to make some 
definite sacrifice to show that country is to some extent worthy of its defenders‟.49  For many 
therefore, the civilian pledge was about creating a metaphysical bond of solidarity through 
mutual sacrifice and, to some degree, enforcing a notional parity in suffering between 
soldiers and civilians. But the Bishop of London‟s comments also demonstrate a 
preoccupation with moral worthiness; the pledge campaign was, in some ways, about the 
nation showing itself to be worthy of its defenders and worthy of the ultimate victory it aimed 
for. 
 
Concerns with solidarity, shared suffering and national worthiness suggest that there was a 
potent moral dimension to debates about the wartime pledge, meaning the campaign looks 
less like a purely rational means to boost efficiency. But as with efficiency, it was widely 
believed that the discernable moral, even spiritual, elements involved in the pledge would 
help the war effort. As the Bishop of Durham explains: „Given a nation virtuous, sober, God-
fearing, those combatants will feel an indefinitely mighty force behind them and will be lifted 
even higher than before in courage and in the moral goodness which is of the soul of the 
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highest forms of valour‟.50 The civilian pledge is therefore connected to providentialism – if 
we do good, God will reward us. It was not (as far as I can tell) explicitly justified as an 
attempt to curry divine favour, but it was certainly a commitment to virtue and goodness that, 
it was widely believed, would help avoid total destruction.51  
 
The civilian pledge, as a boost to „moral goodness‟, has its roots in temperance ideas. 
Although abstinence from alcohol had been practised monastically for hundreds of years, the 
„worldly asceticism‟52 of the teetotal pledge did not come about until the mid-1830s. This was 
not the cloistered self-abasement of holy men but a routine of everyday discipline and self-
control to be lived out in wider society. The first teetotal pledges were taken in Preston, by a 
group of industrial labourers under the stewardship of Joseph Livesey. The idea was soon 
promoted by temperance societies who, like earlier groups aiming to morally reform the 
population, connected their project to issues of providence.53 Teetotalism was partly about 
thrift, labour and material self-betterment. But it was also about moral self-improvement; 
alcohol was viewed as a corrupting influence, an absolute evil that was detrimental to both 
the drinker‟s earthly existence and, more importantly, their ultimate prospects for salvation. 
The temperance movement failed to achieve the total collective sobriety it aimed for, but 
some of its arguments do seem to have become standard ideological currency.  It was 
common, during World War One, to see the pledge referred to as „voluntary self-sacrifice‟54 
or a „heroic act of self-denial‟.55 Even when explaining his decision not to take the pledge, 
Lord Hugh Cecil acknowledged that „all self-denial is admirable‟.56 Teetotalism specifically 
and self-denial generally were seen as positive moral actions, likely to providentially improve 
your, or your country‟s, prospects for salvation. 
 
The tradition of promoting voluntary teetotalism was, therefore, alive and well in Britain in 
this period. Moreover, such acts of self-denial as the teetotal pledge were invested with a 
providential currency which forced routines of sobriety, as engendered by more 
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interventionist government responses, could not match. In a different social and moral 
climate prohibition or nationalisation may have been seen as essential; but in Britain 
behavioural governance did not end at the limits of the law. The pledge campaign was, 
therefore, an extra-legal supplement to the moderate legal response to alcohol during the 
war.57  
 
 
4 Assessments and Further Research 
The pledge campaign highlighted by this paper reveals several interesting points about 
attitudes to alcohol and the law, 1914-1918. Firstly, it demonstrates the existence of certain 
moral or ideological „hangovers‟ from the nineteenth century; the salience of teetotal ideas 
and the understanding of the war as part of the great struggle between teetotalism and drink 
illustrate the enduring salience of Victorian attitudes. Secondly, the vivid discursive presence 
of preoccupations with civilisation and providentialism exhibit a rampant moral dimension to 
wartime understandings of alcohol. The drink question during the war was not, therefore, 
purely about efficiency as Greenaway implies. And finally, we can see the existence of a 
particular model of alcohol governance in Britain based around legal regulation and moral 
compulsion. The law is restrictive not prohibitive; through various legal frameworks it goes a 
certain distance toward enforcing sobriety, but outside of these parameters moral 
compulsion is relied upon to govern individual behaviour (See Appendix 1). This British 
model of alcohol governance, and the Victorian moral legacy it encompasses, helps explain 
the moderate and comparatively peculiar response of the British government to the issue of 
alcohol during World War One. 
 
The wartime pledge campaign has received little scholarly attention up until this point and 
the British model of alcohol governance, of which it forms a part, is similarly under-
researched. The author has argued elsewhere that this particular model of alcohol 
governance has its roots in the Licensing Act 187258 and also intends to investigate the 
extent to which it is still in existence today. But is this model as peculiar to the issue of 
alcohol in Britain as it appears to have been in the period 1914-1918? Is the use of moral 
                                            
57
 It is beyond the methodological scope of this paper to examine whether or not this dual approach of 
legal moderation coupled with moral compulsion was a deliberate government policy. But it seems 
reasonable to suppose that without it, it is likely that harsh alcohol policies would have been seen as 
more necessary. 
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compulsion alongside legal coercion apparent in other areas of governance or in other 
countries‟ regulation of alcohol? Did this normative culture, which prizes voluntary actions 
and self-denial, exist elsewhere? Has teetotalism ever been as forcefully linked to the ideas 
of providence and moral worthiness as in Britain 1914-1918? This analysis of the drink 
question in Britain, 1914-1918, has highlighted several avenues for future research as well 
as providing a new perspective on the employment of moderate alcohol policies during this 
period. 
 
 
 
 
Appendix 1 
Promoting Sobriety: The British Model 
 
 
